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CRIMINAL TERM
BRONX COUNTY

People v Campanioni 382
(printed June 24, 1994)
Defendant, David Campanioni, claimed that his state 383 and
federal 3 84 constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated when police officers seized his
gun pursuant to an unlawful automobile search. 385 The Bronx
County Criminal Term granted the defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence because the seizure of the gun vas
obtained as the fruit of the unlawful search and seizure of the
defendant's automobile. 3 86
Based on the contradictory testimony of the two arresting
police officers, the court found that the officers had stopped the
defendant at a corner because his car was missing a license
plate. 3 87 However, the purpose for the stop was unclear because
one officer claimed that the license plate was not visible, whereas
the other officer testified that the license plate was observed in
the rear window. 3 88 There was also contradictory testimony as to
whether the defendant produced automobile ownership papers. 389
After requesting defendant's license and registration, one of the
382. N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1994, at 25 (Crim. Tern, Bronx County 1994).
383. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, section 12 provides in relevant
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
Id.
384. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...
.))Id.
385. Campanioni,N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1994, at 25.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. It was later determined that Campanioni recently purchased the
automobile at a police auction. Id.
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police officers asked the defendant if he had a gun. 390 The
defendant admitted he was in possession of a gun. 391 The police
officer then removed him from the car, and then took the gun
from the defendant's right pocket.3 92 Whether the search was
conducted before or after the arrest was also contradicted by the
police officers' testimony. 393 After listening to the contradicting
testimony, the Campanioni court concluded that the search was
illegal and that the evidence should be suppressed. 394
Analysis under both the New York State and Federal
Constitutions led the court to determine the conduct of the police
officers was a violation of the defendant's right to be free from
illegal searches and seizures. 3 95 The Campanioni court initially
stated that two issues had to be decided in order to determine
whether the search and seizure was constitutional. 396 First,
whether the police officer's routine traffic stop of defendant's
automobile was lawful. 3 97 Second, the court addressed the issue
of whether the seizure of the gun from the defendant was
lawful. 398
With regard to the first issue, the Campanioni court relied on
People v. Sobotker399 to determine whether a police officer is
justified in conducting a lawful routine traffic check. 400 The
Sobotker court held that it is necessary for police officers to have
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

397. Id. See People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321

N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971) (shifting the burden of proof to the People in a
possessory narcotics and gambling case).
398. Canpanioni,N.Y. L.J., June 29, 1994, at 25.
399. 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978).
400. Campanioni, N.Y. L.J., June 29, 1994, at 25. See Soboiker, 43
N.Y.2d at 563, 373 N.E.2d at 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 995. A routine traffic
check on a highway is justified "only when it is conducted pursuant to
'nonarbitrary. nondiscriminatory, uniform' traffic procedures or when there is
specific cause or reasonable suspicion that a motorist is about to violate a
law." Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/70

2

et al.: Search & Seizure

1158

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 11

a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to stop an
automobile. 401 It is not enough that the police officer has a

"hunch" that there is criminal activity. 402 In Campanioni, the
court noted that the police officers had no reason to suspect
403
criminal activity before they stopped the defendant in his car.
In fact the court noted that one of the police officers testified that
the defendant was acting like a normal person who had done
nothing wrong when he was stopped by the police. 404 Without

more, the court concluded that the police officers were not
sufficiently credible enough to satisfy the prosecution's burden of
proof4O5 and, thus, the defendant's motion to suppress the gun
should have been granted. 406 The court then ruled that, based on
the unlawful traffic stop, the gun seized by the officers was the
"fruit" of an unlawful search. 407
Additionally, the court examined an alternative claim raised by
the People to validate the search and seizure. 40 8 The police
officers contended that the defendant consented to the search and,
thus, the search and seizure was lawful. 409 The court rejected
this claim, relying on People v. Gonzalez4 10 to define the
401. Id. at 564, 373 N.E.2d at 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 996. Reasonable
suspicion is defined as "the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an
ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that
criminal activity'is at hand." Id.
402. Id.
403. Campanioni, N.Y. L.J., June 29, 1994, at 25.
404. Id. The defendant was acting nervously and the police officers
"conceded that such purported 'nervous' movements were typical of people
who have broken no law when stopped by the police." Id.
405. Id. The court noted that at a suppression hearing, the prosecution has
the burden of proof to show that the police conduct was lawful. Id. The court
explained that where the police officers are not credible, the prosecution has
not satisfied their burden. Id. See People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270
N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971).
406. Campanioni, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1994, at 25.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. 39 N.Y.2d 122, 347 N.E.2d 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1976). In
Gonzalez, federal agents arrested Mr. Gonzalez outside of his apartment for
possession and sale of drugs, kicked in the Gonzalez' apartment door, arrested
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meaning of voluntary consent. 4 11 The Campanioni court cited to
several factors to be considered in determining whether a consent
was voluntary, including "the extent to which the individual was
restrained; the individual's personal background, including his
age and prior experience with law enforcement officers; whether

or not the individual was cooperative, and whether he was
advised of his right to refuse consent." 4 12 Relying on these
factors, the court held that the defendant had not voluntarily
4 13
consented to a search.
Although the analysis for state and federal search and seizure
provisions are similar in form and analysis, the level of intrusion

varies slightly. Under New York case law, absent evidence of a
crime, a police officer cannot justify a search of an automobile
during a traffic stop. 4 14 However, the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution permits a police officer a greater level
of "intrusion."' 4 15 Thus, under the New York Constitution, the
Mrs. Gonzalez inside for possession, and performed a routine search for
drugs. Id. at 125, 347 N.E.2d at 578; 383 N.Y.S.2d at 217. After the arrests
the federal agents threatened to separate the newly married couple forever, and
subject them to severe sentencing laws unless they consented to a "full blown
search of the apartment." Id. at 126, 347 N.E.2d at 578, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
Accordingly, they agreed to sign for the search. Id. at 126-27, 347 N.E.2d at
579, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 212. The court held such coercion was impermissible.
Id. at 127-31, 347 N.E.2d at 577-82, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 218-21.
411. Cainpanioni, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1994, at 25. See Gonzalez, 39
N.Y.2d at 128, 347 N.E.2d at 580, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 219. The Gonzalez court
presented a method to determine whether a consent was voluntary:
Consent to search is voluntary when it is a true act of the will, an
unequivocal product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.
Voluntariness is incompatible with official coercion, actual or implicit,
overt or subtle ....No one circumstance is determinative of the
voluntariness of consent. Whether consent has been voluntarily given or
is only a yielding to overbearing official pressure must be determined
from the circumstance ....
Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. See People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709. 321
N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971).
415. Campanioni, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1994, at 25. C. New York v. Class,
45 U.S. 106, 117 (1986) (holding the search and seizure permissible when two
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seizure was impermissible, but the result may be different under
the Federal Constitution.
People v. James 4 16
(printed December 30, 1994)

Defendant moved to suppress physical evidence 4 17 and
statements obtained in violation of his state constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures4 18 and selfincrimination. 4 19 The Bronx County Criminal Court, in denying
defendant's motion to suppress, held that defendant had standing
to challenge the police stop of the livery cab. 4 2 0 In addition, the
court held that the police had probable cause to arrest the
defendant. 4 2 1 Finally, the court held that defendant's consent to

search the car was voluntary. 422

423
On April 10, 1993, two police officers, on routine patrol,

spotted a livery cab operating with a broken rear brake light.4 24
The officers directed the cab driver to pull over to the side of the

road. 425 As the cab was approaching a stop, one officer observed
the passenger "lean forward, place his arms behind his back and
police officers, in an attempt to obtain the VIN number from a car after the
defendant removed himself from his vehicle, observed and seized a gun
underneath the driver's seat).
416. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22 (Crim. Term, Bronx County 11994).
417. Id. The evidence obtained by the police included marijuana and a gun,
a Walter PPK 380. Id.
418. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Section 12 states in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id.
419. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 states in pertinent part: "No person
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.. . ." Id.

420. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. The officers were in the vicinity of East 161st Street and Melrose
Avenue. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
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then bring them forward." 4 26 Once the cab stopped, the officers
exited their vehicle and defendant exited the cab with his hands in
the air stating "I'm just smoking some weed. I'm high on some
weed." 427 The officer on the driver's side pointed his flashlight
toward the back seat of the cab and saw part of a gun stuffed

between the back and seat cushion. 42 8 Subsequently, the gun was
seized and the defendant arrested. 429 As the officers searched
defendant incident to his arrest, they recovered a bag of

marijuana in the defendant's pants pocket. 430 The cab driver was
eventually issued a summons for the violation. 43 1
The court in James first stated that, according to People v.
Ingle,432 police officers who stop a car and detain its occupants
have, in effect, seized that car and those occupants, regardless of
the length of the detention. 433 In determining whether the police
stop was reasonable, the James court further relied on People v.
John B.B.,434 in which the New York Court of Appeals held that

such a determination must be examined in light of an individual's
constitutional rights and the state's interest. 4 35 Further, in People
v. Knight,4 36 the Appellate Division, First Department held that
regardless of any issue of privacy, a passenger of a livery cab has

426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975).
433. Id. at 418, 330 N.E.2d at 42, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
434. 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1982).
435. Id. at 487, 438 N.E.2d at 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 161. In response to a
series of recent burglaries in a local, remote area, the police utilized a "roving
roadblock" for vehicles to ascertain the occupant's identity and to gather
information about the burglaries. Id. at 486, 438 N.E.2d at 866, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 160. As a result of these roadblocks, the police discovered items in one
vehicle which were reported stolen. Id. The court held that these stops were
"uniform, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory and did not violate the
defendant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 488-89,
438 N.E.2d at 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
436. 138 A.D.2d 294, 526 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1st Dep't 1988).
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standing to challenge a police stop. 43 7 Thus, the court in James
relied on the Knight decision and ruled that the defendant had
standing. 438 The court further recognized that pursuant to the
decision in People v. Millan,439 defendant had standing to
challenge the police seizure of the gun as well. 440
The second issue the James court considered was whether the
police stop of the cab based on a traffic violation was lawful. 44 1
In Ingle, the New York Court of Appeals held that a police
officer may stop a car when there is a traffic violation or when
the police have a reasonable suspicion that there has been
criminal activity. 44 2 Because the officers noticed that the cab had
a broken tail light, the James court ruled that the officers had the
right to stop the cab. 44 3
Another constitutional issue before the James court was
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for
possession of the gun and marijuana. 44 4 The court relied on
People v. Sobotker,445 in which the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that, before the police can stop someone in a public plade,
an officer must have reasonable suspicion, which is "the quantum
of knowledge sufficient to believe criminal activity is at
hand." 44 6 Furthermore, the court relied on People v. Carney,447
where the New York Court of Appeals ruled that any seizure,
437. Id. at 296, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
438. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
439. 69 N.Y.2d 514, 508 N.E.2d 903, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1987) (rejecting

the idea that automobile passengers have no standing to challenge a police
search as "offend[ing] fundamental tenets of fairness inherent in New York
criminal jurisprudence").
440. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
441. Id.
442. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d at 416, 330 N.E.2d at 41, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 71
(1975); People v. Clemente, 195 A.D.2d 300, 600 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't
1993) (finding a valid police stop where defendant was passenger in an

automobile which had a defective headlight).
443. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
444. Id.
445. 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978).

446. Id. at 564, 373 N.E.2d at 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
447. 58 N.Y.2d 51, 444 N.E.2d 26, 457 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
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arising from reasonable suspicion, must be based on "'specific'
facts so that its propriety may be measured by the 'detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge."448

Relying on such precedent, the James court stated several
reasons why the officers had probable cause to believe that the
defendant had unlawfully possessed the gun and drugs. First,
defendant quickly exited the cab and admitted to being under the
influence of drugs. 449 Second, in light of the automobile
assumption, the court noted that it was reasonable for the police
to conclude the gun belonged to defendant. 450 Third, the court
found that it was reasonable for the police officers to believe that
defendant possessed marijuana based on defendant's mental state
at the time of search. 451 Based on what the officers knew at the
time of the search, the James court ruled that probable cause
existed to arrest the defendant. 452
In rejecting defendant's Fourth Amendment claim that the
police use of a flashlight constituted a search, the court cited to
the United States Supreme Court decision in Texas v. Brown.453
In Brown, the Supreme Court held that a search is not being
conducted where an officer shines a flashlight into the window of
an automobile. 45 4 Furthermore, in Millan, the New York Court
of Appeals upheld similar police conduct as not constituting a
search. 455 Thus, the court in James held that shining the
flashlight was not a search and, thus, the seizure of the gun was
6
lawful under the plain view doctrine. 45
The plain view doctrine allows law enforcement officials to
seize items without a search warrant if three conditions are
448. Id. at 57, 444 N.E.2d at 29, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
449. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
454. Id. at 740.
455. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d at 519, 508 N.E.2d at 905, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 170

(1987).
456. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
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satisfied: the officer is lawfully in a position to view the item; the
police have lawful access to the item; and the incriminating
nature of the object is immediately apparent. 457 Thus, the court
in James upheld the seizure of the gun under the plain view
doctrine. 4 58
Finally, the James court ruled that defendant's statement that
he was under the influence of drugs was a voluntary statement
and was not obtained in violation of defendant's right to
counsel. 459 In People v. Simpson, 460 the Appellate Division,
First Department held that a defendant's statement is voluntary
when it is in response to police questioning of another witness
which is not meant to induce or provoke the defendant to
speak. 46 1 In James, the court noted that defendant spontaneously
made the statements before the police had an opportunity to
question him.4 62 Thus, the court denied defendant's request to
4 63
suppress the statements.
In the federal courts, a seizure is defined as the application of
physical force or "a submission to the assertion of authority." '4 64
This definition is not as broad as New York's definition, where
the defendant need not be physically restrained to be "seized."
Under federal law, in order for an individual to having standing
to challenge a search or seizure violation, a defendant must
demonstrate that he or she has a "reasonable expectation of

457. People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301, 595

N.Y.S.2d 940, 943 (1984) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 129
(1990)).
458. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.
459. Id.
460. 190 A.D.2d 593, 600 N.Y.S.2d 12 (lst Dep't 1993). In Simpson, the
defendant was arrested and charged with attempted burglary. Id. The defendant

spoke up after hearing an officer question a building superintendent about
whether the defendant had permission to be on the premises. Id. The court held
that any statements made were not "the product of custodial interrogation." Id.
461. Id.
462. James, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1994, at 22.

463. Id.
464. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
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privacy" in the area which was searched. 465 The federal court's
test for standing is essentially the same as New York's test in that
both require a criminal defendant to show a "legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." 4 66
Furthermore, the analysis of automobile stops is similar under
federal law. In Delaware v. Prouse,467 the Supreme Court

engaged in a similar balancing of the state's interest and the
intrusion upon the rights of the individual. 4 68 The purpose of
utilizing a balancing test is to ensure the "reasonableness" of
469
police conduct as it relates to private citizens.
The doctrine of plain view has been heavily relied upon by
federal courts. The Supreme Court has set out standards for the
doctrine of plain view in the case of Horton v. California.470 The
doctrine does not increase the scope of the search but it does
allow officers to seize evidence which was not the actual target of
the search, so long as it satisfies the same three requirements
used by the New York courts.
465. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980). This standing
test is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (outlining the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
466. People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 429 M.E.2d 735, 737, 445
N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1981).
467. 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding random stops to check driver's license
and registration unconstitutional). In Prouse, a patrolman pulled over the
defendant to "check the driver's license and registration" because he "saw the
car in the area and wasn't answering any complaints, so [he] decided to pull
them off." Id. at 650-51. The officer smelled smoke as he approached the car
and found marijuana on the car floor. Id. at 648. The Supreme Court held that
the seizure of the marijuana violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
at 663. The Court found that the legitimate governmental interest in this law
enforcement practice was unreasonable and did not outweigh the "intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests." Id. at 654.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 653-54.
470. 496 U.S. 128 (1990). The police had a warrant to search defendant's
home for weapons and proceeds from a robbery. Id. at 130-31. While
conducting their search, an officer seized a machine gun, two stun guns, and
other items linking the defendant to the robbery. Id. at 131. However, these
items were not listed in the search warrant. Id. The Court found no Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. at 142.
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With respect to the issue of probable cause, the Supreme Court
held that probable cause is defined as "evidence which would

'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that a felony
has been committed." 47 1 Similarly, in New York, for police
officers to have probable cause for arrest, the officers must first

472
have sufficient knowledge to believe criminal activity is afoot.
For the federal courts, as well as for the courts of New York
courts, the seminal case in the area of Fifth Amendment law is
Miranda v. Arizona.473 In Miranda, the Supreme Court
attempted to devise a rule to eliminate much of the physical and
mental coercion utilized by law enforcement officials to get
suspects to incriminate themselves. 474 The Court's remedy
consisted of a set of warnings which must be given to a suspect
before custodial interrogation. 475 In Rhode Island v. Innis,47 6 the

471. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (citing Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
472. See Soborker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993
(1978).473. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant, a suspect in a kidnapping and rape
case, was questioned by two police officers for two hours without being
apprised of his right to counsel or his right against self-incrimination. Id. at
492. He signed a written confession which contained a typed paragraph to the
effect that the confession was voluntary and made with "full knowledge" of all
legal rights, including the right against self-incrimination. Id. at 491-92. The
Court concluded that defendant's signing of this statement did not constitute
"the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights." Id. at 492.
474. Id. at 452 (recognizing use of false lineups and "reverse lineups" to
procure confessions from unwary defendants).
475. Id. at 444. The decision describes Miranda warnings as follows:
"Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed." Id.
476. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The police apprehended the defendant who was
wanted in the shotgun murder of a taxi driver. He was advised of his Miranda
rights and requested to speak with a lawyer. Id. at 294. Three officers
transported defendant to the police station in a "caged wagon." Id. En route,
two of the officers made statements to each other such as "there's a lot of
handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves" and "it would
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Supreme Court elaborated as to what constitutes interrogation for
the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings. The Innis court held
that interrogation refers to express questioning and "any words
or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should

know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect. "477

Many of the principles of unreasonable searches and seizures
and self-incrimination are similar in both the federal courts and
the New York State courts. Although there are some differences
in their interpretation and application, both court systems
promote the same policy objectives: protecting the privacy of all
citizens against arbitrary intrusion by the government and
preventing coerced statements due to illegal action on the part of
law enforcement officials. Therefore, the outcome under federal
law would most likely be the same as decisions made by New
York courts.
CRIMINAL COURT
KINGS COUNTY

People v. Thomas 478
(printed September 12, 1994)
The defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence,
alleging that the police officers who gathered the evidence did not
have reasonable suspicion of either the commission of an
unlawful act, or the presence of danger to justify the search of
the defendant's knapsack. 479 The defendant claimed that seizure
of his knapsack and the automatic weapon found therein violated
be too bad if [a child] would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself." Id. at 29495. Defendant interrupted the officers and told them to let him lead them to the
gun. Id. at 295. The Court held that this conversation between the officers did
not constitute express or implied questioning. Id. at 291.
477. Id. at 301.

478. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32 (Crim. Ct. Kings County).
479. Id.
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his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 480 The defendant's claim falls under both the New York
State Constitution 4 8 1 and the United States Constitution. 4 82 The

Criminal Court, Queens County, granted the defendant's motion
to suppress and held that the police officers did not establish the
requisite suspicion to justify the arrest of the defendant. 4 8 3 The

court, therefore, concluded that the physical evidence obtained
was a result of unlawful police conduct. 484
While on patrol in Kings County, police officers Falconite and
Canny observed a car cross the double yellow lines and make a
left turn without signaling. 4 85 After they noticed these
infractions, the officers stopped the vehicle. 486 Officer Falconite
approached on the left side of the car and asked the driver for his

license, registration, and insurance card while Officer Canny
approached on the passenger side of the car. 487 While Officer
Falconite was speaking with the driver, he observed the
488
defendant in the rear seat on the right side of the vehicle.

Upon learning that the driver did not have a valid drivers license,
Officer Falconite testified that he opened the left rear door to tell

480. Id. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that
evidence illegally obtained by state officials is not admissible in state trial as
Fourth Amendment protection is applied to the states through te Fourteenth
Amendment).
481. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
Id.
482. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. ..." Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ."Id.
483. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the passenger that the vehicle was not a licensed livery cab. 489
The officer then observed what appeared to be a black knapsack
on the rear floor of the vehicle and subsequently ordered the
defendant to exit from the motor vehicle. 4 9 0 As the defendant
exited the vehicle, the officer grabbed the knapsack. 4 9 1 In
response, the defendant turned to the officer and demanded the

return of his bag. 492 According to Officer Falconite's testimony,
he handcuffed the defendant as the defendant attempted to take
his knapsack. 493 He further testified that the knapsack opened

and he recovered a semi-automa.tic pistol with six bullets in the
weapon's clip.4 94
In determining whether the search conducted was
constitutional, the court relied on several New York State
decisions. In People v. Woods,4 95 the Appellate Division, Second

Department held that a police officer may stop a motor vehicle if
there is a showing that the officer observed a violation of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law or that the occupants have been or will

engage in criminal activity. 496 Further, the New York Court of
489. Id. On cross examination, the officer's testimony was impeached by
use of his Grand Jury testimony, in which the officer testified that he opened
the door of the vehicle for safety reasons. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. The officer testified that the knapsack felt heavy as he lifted it with
his right hand, and in cradling the bag with his other hand, he felt what seemed
to be a firearm in a hoister. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. 189 A.D.2d 838, 592 N.Y.S.2d 748 (2d Dep't 1993).
496. Id. at 841, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 750. Despite the arresting officer's
testimony that he had followed the vehicle to ascertain the driver's identity, the
court held that the defendant's vehicle was stopped based on a traffic violation,
namely the officer's observation of the vehicle's tinted windows. Id. at 842,
592 N.Y.S.2d at 751. See People v. Petti, 182 A.D.2d 720. 720, 582
N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that the police officers were
justified in stopping defendant's vehicle since they witnessed numerous Vehicle
and Traffic Law violations); People v. Greene, 135 A.D.2d 449, 451, 522
N.Y.S.2d 860, 861-62 (Ist Dep't 1987) (holding that absent a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal acts or posed a danger. the
forcible detention and frisk of the defendant violated his constitutional rights).
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Appeals has held that when a vehicle is stopped, a police officer
can lean into a motor vehicle to speak to the occupants 497 as well
498
as direct a driver to step out of the vehicle after a lawful stop.
Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 49 9 the United States
Supreme Court held that a police officer is permitted to order the

driver out of a vehicle for questioning, out of the concern for the

police officer's safety. 500
However, the Thomas court held that the present situation
required

a more substantial basis for the police

officers'

actions. 50 1 The court explained that the officers had to establish
the presence of "some articulable facts which initially, or during
the course of the encounter, established reasonable suspicion that
[the defendant was] involved in criminal acts or pose[d) some

danger to the. officer[sl." 502 Instead, the court in Thomas noted
an absence of a reasonable suspicion throughout the entire
investigation. 5 0 3 The court focused on the fact that the defendant
made "no overt gestures or comments that would, even by the

497. See People v. Vasquez, 106 A.2d 327, 331, 483 N.Y.S.2d 244, 248
(1st Dep't 1984) (stating that leaning into a car to speak to the passenger was
not a violation of defendant's rights), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 968, 969, 489 N.E.2d
757, 758, 498 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986).
498. See People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773, 774, 543 N.E.2d 733, 733,
545 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (holding that directing a driver to exit a lawfully stopped
motor vehicle is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment "because [of] the
inherent and inordinate danger to investigating police officers ...

"),

cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989).
499. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
500. Id. at 110-11. The United States Supreme Court held that the
defendant was lawfully detained and the order to exit the vehicle was
reasonable, thus, permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that the standard inquires into whether "a
man of reasonable caution" would believe the action taken at the moment of
the search and seizure was appropriate).
501. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.
502. Id. See People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 479, 443 N.E.2d 447,
452, 457 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (1982) (holding that a "dirty" rental car did not
establish the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
503. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.
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farthest stretch of one's imagination, establish a reasonable
suspicion of an unlawful act." 504
In its analysis, the Thomas court determined that the "[p]eople
failed to establish that the defendant had intentionally abandoned
the knapsack since the officer grabbed the bag before the
defendant had exited the motor vehicle." 5 05 In contrast, in
People v. Burns,506 the Appellate Division, Second Department
held that the police officer's unintentional contact with the
defendant's bag justified a search for its contents. 507 Still, the
Thomas court distinguished the facts in Burns from those in the
case at bar. The court noted that this case was not a situation in
which "a helpful police officer accidentally or unintentionally
comes in 'cradling' contact with a container and makes a brief
initial contact with its exterior." 508 The Thomas court concluded
that the "seizure and inspection of [the defendant's] personal
effects was a significant invasion of his constitutional right to
privacy," 509 since the officer did not accidentally or
unintentionally open the knapsack. 5 10 Therefore, the court
granted the defendant's suppression motion. 5 11
Similar to New York case law, the Supreme Court has held that
in order to seize an item in plain view, the item must be
"suspicious" at the time the officer is viewing the item and that
items not suspicious in nature cannot be validly seized. 5 12
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled, in New York v.
Class,5 13 that when police officers lean into a car to remove
papers blocking the Vehicle Identification Number and observe a
504. Id.
505. Id. See People v. Scott, 82 N.Y.2d 729, 731, 621 N.E.2d 689, 689,
602 N.Y.S.2d 322, 322 (1993) (holding that defendant abandoned a bag in a
taxi when he attempted flight from arresting officer).
506. 182 A.D.2d 633, 582 N.Y.S.2d 234 (2d Dep't 1992).
507. Id. at 633-34, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
508. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. See Texas v. Brovn, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1982).
513. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
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gun, seizure of such weapon is permissible. 5 14 Thus, even where

an officer is justified in leaning into an automobile and informing
a driver of a traffic violation, any items noticeable in the car
must still be "suspicious" in nature in order for officers to seize
such items.

NEW YORK COUNTY

People v. Scarborough 5 15
(printed April 28, 1994)

The defendant claimed that his right to be free from illegal
5 16
searches and seizures was violated under both the New York
and United States 5 17 Constitutions when he was arrested after a
"full blown" search of his locker contents. 5 1 8 The Criminal
Court, New York County, held that the "full blown" search of
the defendant's work locker, notwithstanding the defendant's
limited consent to a visual inspection, was violative of both the
state and federal constitutions. 5 19 Consequently, the court held
that the seizure of property therein was illegal and the evidence
520
should have been suppressed.
On July 30, 1993, while employed as a peace officer by
Barneys New York, Special Police Officer Rivera received a
telephone call from a confidential informant naming the
514. Id. at 109.
515. N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29 (Crim. Ct. New York County 1994).
516. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, § 12 provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. . '
Id.
517. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses.
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... ."Id.
518. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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defendant as one of two individuals who had allegedly stolen
watches from the store, and, subsequently, placed them in his
locker. 5 2 1 Upon this information, Special Police Officer Rivera,
22
in the presence of a union delegate as required by store policy,5
asked the defendant to comply with an inspection of his
locker. 5 23 The defendant thereafter complied with the officer's
request, stating "No problem," and at which time the officer
visually inspected the contents of the locker. 524 Following the
limited visual inspection, the officer asked to examine one of the
items again, namely sneakers with paper packed in them, to
which request the defendant objected. 5 25 Upon the officer's
insistence, the defendant once again, without responding,
removed the sneakers from the locker and the paper stuffed
therein and, in turning them upside down, "two watches fell to
52 7
the floor." 526 The defendant was subsequently arrested.

The court initially stated that "[a]t issue in every suppression
hearing is whether the defendant possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched. .. "528 However,
even if the defendant maintained such an expectation, the court
concluded that the search could nevertheless be found reasonable
if the search was conducted with a warrant 52 9 or was recognized
under one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 530
521. Id.

522. M. As part of Barneys New York's store procedures, all employees
are assigned a locker and supplied with the combination lock. Id. Both the
employee and Barneys have knowledge of the combination, however,
inspection of the locker, without the employee's consent, is limited to when the
employee is effectively terminated. Id. Under all other circumstances, the
employee and/or a union delegate must be present when the search is
performed. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.

525. Id. The defendant stated to the police officer, "I showed you these
sneakers before." Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.

528. Id.
529. Id. See People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746,

447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982) ("By interposing the requirement of a warrant
issued judicially, upon information attested by oath or affirmation and which
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The Scarborough court, in reaching its holding that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, relied on the
two-part test elicited by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United
States,53 1 wherein he stated that two requirements needed to be
satisfied in determining whether the defendant maintained an
expectation of privacy. 532 The first requirement is that "a person
must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy." 533 The second requirement includes a finding that "the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable." ' ' 534 Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned that
when a person clearly seeks to protect something that is purely
private, even when the area might be publicly vulnerable, he may
be constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amendment. 535
In applying the Katz test to the case at bar, the Scarborough
court ruled that although the limited inspection of the defendant's
locker was reasonable, 53 6 the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy when he previously stuffed his sneaker
with paper "so as to secure and secrete its contents."' 537
Furthermore, "in light of the defendant's knowledge of previous
locker inspections," the court found it was "clear that the only
reason for stuffing the sneaker was to prevent others ... from

determining the nature and contents of the sneaker." 538

establishes probable cause, the [New York] State Constitution protects the
privacy interests of people of our State . . ").
530. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
531. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

532. Id. at 361.
533. Id.
534. Id..
535. Id. at 351.

536. The court analogized the defendant's expectation of privacy with that
of the defendant in People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982). In the Belton case, the court found the police officer's
search of the defendant's jacket pocket reasonable, "as incident to [his]
arrest," after a routine speeding stop alerted the officer to the defendant's
possession of marijuana. Id. at 51-52, 432 N.E.2d at 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
874.
537. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
538. Id.
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The Scarborough court stated that although the visual
inspection of the locker and the sneakers by the officer was
reasonable, 53 9 the scope of the inquiry was limited to the
reasonableness of the defendant's subjective expectation of
privacy as compared to an objectively recognized exception by
society. 540 "With respect to the locker, the defendant exhibited a
subjective expectation that the locker contents would remain
private by locking it and.., one could conclude that such
expectation was objectively reasonable." 5 41 The court also noted
that the defendant's reasonable expectation to privacy was
reasonable in an objective nature as well as subjective. 542
After determining that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the court examined whether the search
was still valid based upon the defendant's consent to the
search. 543 Relying on the New York Court of Appeals decision
in People v. Whitehurst,5 44 the court recognized that the burden
539. Id. The court found that the defendant's consent, given voluntarily as
evidenced by his statements, provided the officer with the authority to conduct
a limited visual inspection of his locker. Id.
540. id. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); People v.
Mercado, 68 N.Y.2d 874, 875, 501 N.E.2d 27, 29, 508 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421
(1986) ("[The Fourth Amendment] does not protect every subjective
expectation of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as
reasonable.. .

.");

see also People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 209, 306

N.E.2d 777, 780, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1973) ("In determining the
reasonableness of the intrusion, it should be tested by 'balancing the need to
search against the intrusion which the search entails.'") (citation omitted).
541. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
542. Id. "The courts have consistently held that an expectation of privacy in
containers is one which [society deems] reasonable." Id. See People v. Smith,
59 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1983)
("Although probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a
crime will justify the search of his person ...it will not necessarily justify the
search of a container accessible to him.').
543. Id.
544. 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674
(1969). "Initially, the defendant carries the burden of proofwhen he challenges
the legality of a search and seizure ...but the People have the burden of
goingforward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance."
Id. at 391, 254 N.E.2d at 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 674. See Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543. 548 (1968) ("When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon
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of proof is on the People to show whether defendant's consent
was voluntary. 545 Moreover, the court determined that the
voluntariness of the defendant's consent was "based upon the
totality of the circumstances ....,546 Although the defendant's
consent may have reasonably been inferred with respect to the
limited visual inspection, the court found that he did not consent
to a "full blown" locker search.547 While "[n]o one circumstance
is determinative of the voluntariness of consent," the court
further reasoned that the defendant's objection to the subsequent
search of his locker contents and defendant's failure to respond to
the officer's request for a subsequent search of his sneaker
54 8
demonstrated the involuntary nature of his consent.
The Scarborough court cited People v. Guzman549 for the
proposition that limited consent to a search does not
automatically allow a "full blown" search. 550 The Guzman court
found that the defendant's detention for a speeding violation did
not permit the .officer to inspect the contents of his automobile

which was unrelated to the violation and an inspection of which

consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that
the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.").
545. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
546. Id.; see People v. Sora, 176 A.D.2d 1172, 1174, 575 N.Y.S.2d 970.
972 (3d Dep't 1991) ("The voluntariness of defendant's consent is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances . .

").

547. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29; see People v. Cohen,
58 N.Y.2d 844, 846, 446 N.E.2d 774, 775, 460 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (1983)
(holding that defendant's consent to initial entry into apartment did not extend
to subsequent inspections the following day).
548. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29. See Whitehurst. 25
N.Y.2d at 392, 254 N.E.2d at 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 675 ("[A]n affirmative
response ...would constitute a constitutional waiver.").

549. 153 A.D.2d 320, 551 N.Y.S.2d 709 (4th Dep't 1990).
550. See Cohen, 58 N.Y.2d at 846, 446 N.E.2d at 775, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 19
("[T]he defendant's consent to initial entry did not extend to the ones the police
effected on the following morning .

. . .");

see also People v. Estrella, 160

A.D.2d 250, 251, 553 N.Y.S.2d 358. 359 (1st Dep't 1990) (holding that
because "[the defendant] was under arrest at the time is not, by itself.
sufficient to vitiate the otherwise voluntary nature of his consent and
cooperation").
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would constitute a serious invasion of his privacy. 5 5 1 Thus, the

court found the following exchange between the police officer
and the defendant, "[d]o you mind if I take a look in your
vehicle?" ... "[n]o, I don't mind, go ahead," only allowed the

officer to inspect the defendant's car and not a complete search of
the car which would entail removing the rear seat. 552
The court, in Scarborough, similarly rejected the prosecutor's
argument that the defendant's voluntary consent to the locker
inspection should extend to the contents of containers therein. 5 53
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on testimony that the
defendant was directed to remove the sneakers from his
locker. 554 The court distinguished between a voluntary
inspection, to which request the defendant replied "No problem,"
and a "full blown" search of the contents of the locker and its
containers, to which the defendant protested. 555

The United States Constitution also supports the concept of a
limited search based on a limited consent. 556 Under the Fourth
551. Guzman, 153 A.D.2d at 322, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 711. Yhe court further
stated that:
Although under certain circumstances a police officer who has validly
arrested an occupant of an automobile may contemporaneously search
the passenger compartment including any containers found therein, this
right is limited only to situations where the police 'have reason to
believe that the car may contain evidence relatedto the crime ...
Id. at 323, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
552. Id. at 324, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 712. In People v. Grajales, 136 A.D.2d
564, 523 N.Y.S.2d 560 (2d Dep't 1988), the Second Department found that
the officer's search, predicated on immigration offenses, did not afford them
the right to search the apartment further without the consent of the defendant.
Id. at 565, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
553. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
554. Id. For consent to be considered voluntary, the circumstances under
which it was given must be examined and, it must not be the result of "official
coercion, actual or implicit, overt or subtle." Id.
555. Id.
556. See United States v. White, 541 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (N.D. I11. 1982)
("If a search is conducted pursuant to a consent, any part of the search not
within the bounds of the consent is unlawful."): United States v. Taibe, 446 F.
Supp. 1142, 1147 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the extent of a search
conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent is limited by the bounds of the
actual consent).
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Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and article I, section 12, of the New York State
Constitution, an officer's search is limited to either the infraction
for which the defendant is being investigated, absent a warrant or
exception under the Exclusionary Rule, or, alternatively, to the
"scope and duration" of the defendant's consent. 557 The language
of both provisions precluding unlawful searches and seizures is
identical .558

Under federal constitutional law, as well as New York
constitutional law, it appears that as long as the officer acts in
compliance with an objectively reasonable societal expectation of
privacy, the search will be lawful. Therefore, both the New York
State and the United States Constitutions prohibit police officers
from conducting "full blown" searches of a defendant's property
and containers therein, where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy and the consent has been limited.

557. See People v. Guzman, 153 A.D.2d 320, 551 N.Y.S.2d 709 (4th
Dep't 1990).
558. See People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 460, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1228,

465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (The court of appeals has "repeatedly recognized that
the similar language used in section 12 of article 1 of the State Constitution
means that it should be interpreted in the same manner as the Fourth
Amendment.. .

.")

(Jasen, J., concurring).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

23

